

Józef M. Fiszer

THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OR THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? CAUSES AND EFFECTS

INTRODUCTION

Responding to a question posed in the title of this paper it seems to me that today we are dealing with the crisis of the European Union and also with the crisis of European integration, but the crisis in the European Union, which determines the crisis of European integration, is primary and has more dangerous effects. There is no doubt that post-war European integration is an unprecedented process in the history of the modern world. Also without a precedent is the European Union which is the result of this process and which is an international organization, but it is unusual because of its objectives and functions. It is also not a state but a specific organization, integrating both states and people, combining only some of the features of the state and international organizations. It is a voluntary union of sovereign and democratic states. The Union, in contrast to classical international organizations plays legislative functions in a wide range, and they are a fundamental premise of its existence. Thus, it is similar to a state (especially federal), because it exercises public authority resulting in the legal instruments applicable indirectly and addressed not only to countries but also to individuals and legal entities. The legitimacy of the EU's sources of power arises from the founding treaties ratified by all Member States. This authority is based on delegating certain competencies of power to the Union by the states¹. Many authors, among others, David Beetham and Christopher

¹ See Kranz, J., Wyrozumska, A. 2012. Powierzenie Unii Europejskiej niektórych kompetencji a Traktat fiskalny. [Conferral of competences on the European Union and the Fiscal Stability Treaty.] *Państwo i Prawo*, no. 7, pp. 20–36. See

Lord emphasize that the issue of legitimacy of the EU's institutional system is still relevant (in play), as it concerns the constant changes in the EU, which therefore takes over new competences which have been previously performed by its Member States².

In the light of the neo-functional theory, the European Union is a self-propelling mechanism whose essence lies in the fact that each stage of its development results in the need for further steps (spillovers), that is increasing its competences (deepening of integration). This leads to constant tensions caused by the scope and pace of changes, defining national interests and understanding of democracy and sovereignty. This is primarily a political problem, and to a lesser extent, a legal one. In international relations, however, there is not and probably will not be for a long time a global parliament, courts or government. The establishment of such institutions is possible only with the treaty consent of all countries, as it indeed takes place, but only in a substantively and geographically limited scope³.

The classical analysis of the nature of the European Union demonstrates that it is a *sui generis* political entity, with a hybrid character, that is located between a confederation and federation, but in an untypical manner from the point of view of the division of competences between the national and the European (supranational) level. As long as the EU is a *sui generis* structure, we will deal with a combination of characteristics of an intergovernmental international organization, a supranational organization and a state, and the legitimacy of this structure should have a specific character, in which 'democratic legitimacy plays a leading role, but is supplemented by other sources, thanks to which the functioning of the institutional system of the EU, and the EU, could be considered legitimate'⁴.

In recent years, we have encountered more and more demands for further federalization of the European Union, which would help to overcome its

more on this topic in: Kubin, T. 2014. *Legitymizacja systemu instytucjonalnego Unii Europejskiej*. [Legitimization of the European Union institutional system.] Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

² See Beetham, D., Lord, Ch. 1998. *Legitimacy and the European Union*. London–New York, p. 125.

³ See Finkelstein, L.S. 1995. What is global governance. *Global Governance*, no. 1, p. 368; Lipschutz, R.D. 1997. From place to planet: local knowledge and global environmental governance. *Global governance*, no. 3, p. 83; Czaputowicz, J. 2007. *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja*. [Theories of international relations. Criticism and systematization.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, pp. 354–358.

⁴ See Kubin, T. *Legitymizacja systemu instytucjonalnego Unii Europejskiej*. [Legitimization of the European Union institutional system.] p. 18.

inertia, including the economic, social and political crisis and to strengthen Europe's position in the international arena. On the other hand, many researchers indicate that the federal system is not adequate for the reality of the EU, including the dynamisation of the European integration differentiation processes. They argue that a more useful formula for the European Union will be an empire, defined by the relationships of asymmetry between the centre and peripheries, a variable spatial structure, determined by territorial expansion and the logic of two-level identity – national (domestic) identity and the so-called civilizing mission⁵.

The financial and economic crisis and the crisis in Ukraine demonstrate clearly that the current EU system does not stand the test, and its policies – both internal and external – are not effective. The Union faces the problem of actually unlimited and unclear formal competences, and the lack of resources necessary for their implementation. EU policy makers undertake ambitious projects, such as the creation of the economic and monetary union, or common foreign and defence policy, but without regard to objective limitations or possibilities of their realization. As a result, new dividing lines appear, and the largest European Union countries and their citizens, including France and Germany, a tandem, which has been its locomotive so far, criticize the EU louder and louder and are opposed to its further extension and deepening. According to the polls, as many as 73% of Germans now believe that their country can no longer afford to be involved to a greater extent in the rescue of the euro and in the effort to build united Europe⁶. Meanwhile, it is known that without further German and French involvement in solving the EU's crises and problems, the federal 'European project' is doomed to failure. Many other Member States also look today at the federalisation of Europe with scepticism, fearing not only the loss of privileges won on the basis of existing regulations in the EU, the best example of which is the attitude of Great Britain, on the other hand, being afraid of increasing the role of the Federal Republic of Germany

⁵ See Beck, U. 2009. *Europa kosmopolityczna: społeczeństwo i polityka w drugiej nowoczesności*. [Cosmopolitan Europe: society and politics in the second modernity.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Gravier, M. 2011. Empire vs. Federation: which path for Europe? *Journal of Political Power*, no. 7.

⁶ See Garczewski, K. 2015. Niemcy we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych – regionalne przywództwo, globalne ambicje. [Germany in contemporary international relations – regional leadership, global ambitions.] In: Bania, R., Zdulski, K. eds. *Wyzwania i problemy współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych*. [Challenges and problems of contemporary international relations.] Łódź: Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Międzynarodowych, Oddział Łódzki, pp. 21–40.

in 'new', more institutionally centralized Europe⁷. Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front in France which enjoys growing public support, does not hide that she is committed to the collapse of the European Union, describing it as 'the Soviet European Union' which 'stole sovereignty' and limits the possibility of 'self-determination by national authorities'⁸.

Geopolitical tensions among Paris, London and Berlin, and between Washington and Berlin have led to turbulences in the integration processes in Europe and also contribute to the creation of euro-sceptic moods in the EU. Public opinion polls conducted by the European Commission confirm it. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, confidence in public authorities, both European and national ones, has been declining steadily. However, it is stronger in the case of the EU institutions (a decline of nearly 30% between 2007 and 2012; in the same period the decrease of confidence to the national authorities amounted on average to approximately 20%)⁹.

Today in the European Union we have less and less solidarity, trust, integrity and faith, as well as optimism about its prospects. Enemies of the Union today are not only Eurosceptics, but also realists who easily find arguments that all of this works badly, and so you have to take care only about your own interests. Such a selfish and demanding attitude has been long demonstrated in the EU by the United Kingdom, which has intensified under Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, who threatens to take it out of the Union and to this end has announced a referendum in 2017. Cameron cynically uses anti-immigrant sentiments which strengthen the anti-EU and nationalist tendencies in Europe. Disastrous relations of D. Cameron with Brussels also hinder the development of common EU policy towards Moscow. After the victorious parliamentary election on 7 May 2015 and D. Cameron's spectacular success in it, the threat of Brexit, or exit of the UK from the European Union, has increased, which would strongly hit the geopolitical importance of the EU in the world and undermine its foundations¹⁰. Tony Blair, a Labour Party politician, former British Prime

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁸ See Grosse, T.G. 2014. W oczekiwaniu na rewolucję. [In anticipation of the revolution.] *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 August 2014, p. A11. Cf: Brexit znaczy katastrofa Z Tonym Blairem rozmawia Michał Frąk. [Brexit means disaster. Michał Frąk's interview with Tony Blair.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 20–21 June 2015, p. 31.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ See Bielecki, T. 2015. Brytyjskie chmury nad Unią. [British clouds over the Union.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 9–10 May 2015, p. 2; Czarnecki, M. 2015. Wielki sukces Camerona. [Great success of Cameron.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 9–10 May 2015, p. 10.

Minister, believes that if this happens, it 'will be a great disaster', both for the UK and the European Union¹¹.

The aim of this article is an attempt to answer questions about the sources and effects of the crises which the EU is facing today, and which have led to the crisis in the process of European integration. At the same time I want to show strengths which the EU still has and its weaknesses which determine its position on the international arena and determine its position with regard to the events occurring in the world today, especially when it comes to the crisis in Ukraine, Islamic terrorism growing in the world and, in general, the chaos which threatens the security of Europe and inhibits the process of building a multipolar global order. These problems and Russia's attack on sovereign Ukraine, just like the USA's aggression in Iraq in 2003, have led to the breakdown of solidarity, deepening of divisions and disagreements between countries belonging to the European Union. Moreover, the relations between the EU and the United States are also loosening, which until now have been a foundation of security and transatlantic cooperation. What is happening in Ukraine is a test for the EU and NATO. It shows to what extent they are consistent and ready to cooperate and whether they can conduct common policy and speak with one voice. Unfortunately, this test is unsuccessful for the EU and NATO. We are dealing with a crisis of the European Union and NATO. Vladimir Putin does everything to circumvent the Union and talk with each country individually and he achieves diplomatic and propaganda successes here. Moscow threatens the EU and America with a new world war and thus prevents the West from giving military aid to the victims of the Russian aggression. Russia, not long ago called a 'strategic partner' of the EU, is now a strategic problem. In some important aspects it may even be called a strategic rival¹².

This article shows that the EU loses its importance as an active player in international relations and becomes a more and more passive actor on the international scene, it rather plays a supporting role. It is simply disregarded in Moscow, Beijing and Washington, and treated instrumentally by Berlin, Paris or London, that is in the capitals of countries that have the greatest impact on the process of building new multipolar global governance and its security. At the same time the EU shows indecisiveness, it does not speak with one voice in the international arena; the particularisms of Member States

¹¹ See Brexit znaczy katastrofa... [Brexit means disaster...] p. 31.

¹² See Czech, M. 2015. Kreml straszy świat wojną. [Kremlin threatens the world with a war.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 9 March 2015, p. 10.

exacerbate, and also its other shortcomings are revealed. The EU's position in international organizations diminishes. For example, now it is not at all represented on the board of the World Bank, even as an observer, which is in contradiction with its large-scale policy of assistance directed to developing countries¹³. Therefore, the demand to grant the EU the permanent observer status at the World Bank is more and more often proposed. In the UN General Assembly the EU is currently one of 67 permanent observers. In practice, EU representatives may speak only after all interested representatives representing 192 Member States of the organization have spoken. Only in exceptional circumstances, the EU is granted the right to speak before the other observers¹⁴.

The main thesis of this article is the observation that the European Union is still in deep crisis, is still drifting, and this can cause its disaster. The crisis, or rather crises, hamper integration processes in Europe and contribute to the accumulation of anti-EU attitudes. The only hope is that the new leaders, with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker in the foreground, will do everything to steer the EU back on the track of rapid economic, political and social development and to make it become an important pole in the multipolar world. To this end, the EU must resume the process of its widening and deepening, and enhance cooperation with NATO and the United States. It should also look for opportunities to reach an agreement with Russia, without which it is impossible to peacefully resolve the issue of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries.

1. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOURCE OF ITS CURRENT CRISES

Immersed in numerous crises, tired and being at a crossroads today, the European Union needs a new axiology, solidarity and refreshing of forgotten words, concepts and emotions, which in the past motivated the efforts to

¹³ See more on this topic in: Kołodziejczyk, K. 2013. *Stosunki Unii Europejskiej z grupą państw Afryki, Karaibów i Pacyfiku*. [Relations of the European Union with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Rambler, pp. 81–96; Holland, M. 2002. *The European Union and the Third World*. New York: Palgrave.

¹⁴ See Emmerson, M., Balfour, R., Corthaut, T., Wouters, J., Kaczyński, P.M., Renard, T. 2011. *Upgrading the EU's Role as global actor*. Brussels: CEPS, p. 67; Rewizorski, M. 2015. *Agora interesów. G 20 i wylanie się globalnego zarządzania*. [Agora of interests. G20 and the emergence of global governance.] Warszawa: Difin, p. 65.

build secure, united, democratic and wealthy Europe. It needs above all new great leaders, visionaries, able to present a captivating vision¹⁵.

It is high time to begin a serious debate about these issues in the European Union, and especially a debate on its ideology and core values. About what European identity, responsibility and solidarity are today and what they actually should be. What responsibilities it imposes on the richest and on the poorest members of the EU family. Without credible naming, reminding or rediscovery of that European identity, the Union will not be able to function normally, solve effectively its economic, social and political problems, increase, develop and modernize, and as a result of that it will come to an even greater crisis, and perhaps even disintegration. This is just what Russia, which has been supporting the anti-EU forces in Europe for years, is waiting for¹⁶.

The financial and economic crisis has also exposed many weaknesses of the European Union, and especially the powerlessness of technocratic management of EU policies and has revealed the real centres of power in the EU's complex political system, where daily activities do not always at first glance indicate the centres of making key decisions. First of all, it has revealed the weakness of the leading supranational decision-making body of European Union, namely the European Commission and the powerlessness of its President. This crisis, unprecedented in the recent history of Europe and the EU, has also shown the weakness of the intergovernmental factor and the divisions, egoism and particularism persisting in the European Union. In the majority of European countries, citizens have lost confidence in it, and the process of disintegration increases. It happens because the EU has not had charismatic leaders, visionaries or prominent politicians for a long time. It is directed by bureaucrats and party activists, detached from the people and their needs, and its political system is flawed and needs deep and not just

¹⁵ Malendowski, W. 2010. Suwerenność państw w procesie integracji europejskiej. [The sovereignty of states in the process of European integration.] *Przegląd Politologiczny*, no. 4, pp. 7–20; Smoczyński, W. 2011. Europa się chwieje. [Europe is swaying.] *Polityka* 29 June – 5 July 2011; Baczyński, J. 2011. Czy porwiemy Europę? [Will we enchant Europe?] *Polityka* 6 July – 12 July 2011.

¹⁶ Russia keeps close contacts with the extreme right in Europe, among others, with such groups as the French National Front, the Hungarian Jobbik, the Austrian FPÖ, the Greek Golden Dawn, the Belgian Vlaamas Belang, the Bulgarian Ataka. Their leaders are invited to Moscow to make speeches in the Duma, give lectures at universities, for meetings with politicians at various levels. See Prus, J. 2015. Defilada mitów. [The parade of myths.] *Polityka* 6–12 May 2015, pp. 16–18.

cosmetic changes. It must change as quickly as possible. The European Union wanting to survive must evolve towards a civil and social state¹⁷.

Already at the beginning of the twenty-first century, many scholars, policymakers and journalists, and above all the representatives of various social groups warned that the traditional model of international relations is not sufficient for the recognition of the emerging and difficult to characterize global political order based largely on specialized institutions acting beyond the borders of the state. Both state as well as beyond-state actors of international relations are faced with the need to find their place in the reality that is seen as increasingly less clear and 'postmodern'¹⁸.

The processes of globalization, determining international integration today, cause that states are not able to solve many problems and develop independently. Opportunities and threats have a reciprocal cross-border nature and the role of the state inevitably changes. The loss or limitation of certain competences may, however, be compensated by new opportunities in international cooperation (international law and organizations). The requirements of democracy move thereby from the state to the dissimilar international plane. As a result, the European Union gradually becomes similar to a state, but is a separate legal entity. International institutions from the nature of things are always in some opposition (competition) in relation to national institutions. In turn, states and nations are not in danger in the European Union, because integration prevents their isolation or marginalization and contributes to the growth of their well-being and provides them with broadly understood security.

There is no doubt that after sixty years since the creation of the first Communities and twenty years since its creation, the European Union

¹⁷ See Fiszer, J.M. 2014. Czy państwo demokratyczne może być wzorem dla przyszłej Unii Europejskiej? [Can a democratic state be a model for the future development of the European Union?] *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, no. 1(44), pp. 101–125; Ruszkowski, J., Wojnicz L. 2013. eds. *Multi-level governance w Unii Europejskiej [Multi-Level governance in the European Union.]* Szczecin–Warszawa: Instytut Politologii i Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Instytut Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

¹⁸ See Łoś-Nowak, T. 2011. O potrzebie rekonstrukcji przestrzeni badawczej w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Refleksje natury polityczno-normatywnej, systemowej i metaforycznej. [About the need for reconstruction of the research area in the science of international relations. Reflections of the political and normative, systemic and metaphorical nature.] *Przegląd Politologiczny*, no. 1 pp. 25–31; Pietraś, M. 2008. Hybrydowość późnowestwalskiego ładu międzynarodowego. [The hybridity of the late Westphalian international order.] In: Pietraś, M., Marzęda, K. eds. Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, pp. 57–75.

needs a new vision of development and strategy of action and far-reaching modernization and democratization. Today, we must answer not only the question of whether the model of democracy in a state can be a model for the European Union and whether the Union should become a state (a superpower), but above all, we must answer the question, what should be done to make Europeans still want the Union and not to lead to its breakdown¹⁹.

All measures should be used so that the EU becomes an active player on the international stage and plays an important role in building a new international order, in which it should be one of the main pillars. To this end, the unity and cooperation of all countries belonging to the European Union, and especially the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, is necessary. Further cooperation between the EU and the United States and the EU and NATO is also essential. If it is not intensified, the Euro-Atlantic system will lose its meaning and cease to be a guarantor of security of the West. In view of the current bankruptcy of Union's eastern policy, it is also necessary to develop a new form of the EU and NATO cooperation and policy towards Russia, and adopt a new, far-sighted transatlantic strategy for this country²⁰.

The battle for the future of Ukraine has destabilized the international environment in the immediate vicinity of the EU borders, and some countries for the first time since the end of the Cold War have noticed the threat of Russian aggression. It is today a worrying situation for Europeans, who endowed with several decades of peace, have already ruled out the possibility of an armed conflict on our continent. People too quickly believed in the democratic peace theory which assumed that democratic states are less likely to go to war with one another than authoritarian states. Today, in the light of various conflicts and wars which are taking place in the world, even among democratic states, this theory also appears to be false, based on idealized expectations detached from reality. Therefore, we should redefine European security and define the role of the EU's defence policy and relations with NATO and the United States. A common strategy should be adopted as quickly as possible to protect Europe and the world against the imperial ambitions of the Russian President, who wants to restore Russia's position as

¹⁹ See. Fiszer, J.M. 2014. Czy państwo demokratyczne może być wzorem dla przyszłej Unii Europejskiej? [Can a democratic state be a model for the future development of the European Union?] pp. 101–125.

²⁰ See Krzemiński, A. 2014. Niemcy na huśtawce. [Germany on a swing.] *Polityka* 30 July–5 August 2014, pp. 43–45.

a global superpower and regain influence in the post-Soviet areas, establishing the Eurasian Union for this purpose, aimed to reduce the influence of the EU and the United States in Europe and the world. Vladimir Putin has been conducting aggressive policy to rebuild the influence of the Soviet empire for a long time. He dreams of reconnecting countries which after the collapse of the Soviet Union got out of control of the Kremlin. Chechnya, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia have already been at gunpoint and now it is Ukraine. The territorial integrity of the sovereign state was violated, the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the basic principles of international law were broken. In the light of international law the connection of the Crimean Peninsula (Crimea) being a part of the Ukrainian territory to the Russian Federation must be classified as annexation, that is the illegal acquisition of a territory of another country through the use of and/or threats to use military force. The Russian Federation also violated its legal obligations to the international community²¹. In fact, the existing international order was destroyed. Baltic countries may be the next victims of his policy²². As Professor Richard Pipes, an eminent expert on Russia, writes, Putin's actions are reasonable in the context of Russian history because Russians like strong leaders, and he fills this role perfectly. In their optics, 'only Russia opposing the United States remains a great superpower. Russians may be hungry, but as long as they have a sense of superpower, everything is fine'²³.

On the other hand, given the fact that in the modern world in which firmly defined interests of countries, especially of superpowers, are decisive, they have to be taken into consideration. Even more so, as shown in this analysis, today the realistic paradigm still has large explanatory usefulness in the study of international reality, which claims that the contemporary world is changing fast and before our very eyes a new international order is being formed in which the so-called emerging powers, included in the BRIC

²¹ See more on this topic in Opinia Doradczego Komitetu Prawnego przy Ministrze Spraw Zagranicznych RP w sprawie przyłączenia Półwyspu Krymskiego do Federacji Rosyjskiej w świetle prawa międzynarodowego. [The opinion of the Legal Advisory Committee to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation in the light of international law.] *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 3/2014, pp. 121–131.

²² See Nowak, A. 2014. *Putin. Źródła imperialnej agresji*. [Putin. Sources of imperial aggression.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic!; Wójcik, Ł. 2015. *Więzień Kremla*. [The prisoner of the Kremlin.] *Polityka* 1–6 January 2015, pp. 22–24; Siła rządzi światem. Z Richardem Pipesem rozmawia Michał Potocki. [Force rules the world. Michał Potocki's review with Richard Pipes.] *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* 20–22 March 2015, pp. A8–A9.

²³ See, *Siła rządzi światem...*, [Force rules the world...] p. A8.

group, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China, begin to play the main role. In contrast to the United States and the European Union, the financial and economic crisis has not significantly weakened the economic potential of the BRIC zone. Despite the noticeable collapse of major macroeconomic indicators, especially in 2008, and a slowdown of growth in the following years, these countries still represent a phenomenon unique in the world in terms of economic growth. According to experts, this trend will continue for several more decades, ultimately allowing the BRIC countries – with particular reference to China – to take the existing economic position of developed countries of the Western world because falling into an increasing spiral of debt they lose their already barely visible dominance. According to the forecasts for 2050 the list of countries with the highest GDP will look like this: China, the USA, India, Brazil, Mexico and Russia. The BRIC countries now occupy approximately 25% of the Earth, which is home to 40% of the world population and their GDP is approximately 3/5 of domestic product of the United States, but after using the purchasing power parity it already slightly exceeds it²⁴.

For over sixty years, successive generations of Europeans have been witnessing the peaceful unification of the continent. And for more than twenty five years the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, which after World War II were on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, have participated in this process. The beneficiaries of European integration are today all Europeans, including millions of Poles who belong to the greatest enthusiasts of the Union among European nations. Today, however, the EU is experiencing a number of difficulties, which can even be called crises: political, economic, financial, social, axiological and structural, which seriously inhibit its activity on the international forum. Recent years have also been one of the most difficult periods in the history of European integration, overshadowed by such phenomena and processes as the still insurmountable financial and economic crisis in the euro area, the bankruptcy of Greece, tensions in relations with Russia because of the situation in eastern Ukraine, the risks resulting from the unstable situation in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East, migration and immigrants whose number has grown since the so-called Arab Spring and the creation of the Islamic State. As

²⁴ See Mroziewicz, K. Duzi chcą być jeszcze więksi. [The big want to be even bigger.] *Polityka*, no. 38, pp. 14–17; Karpienia, M. 2013. Kryzys gospodarczy a kraje strefy BRIC [The economic crisis and the BRIC countries.] In: Bocian, A.F. ed. *Globalizacja – Polityka – Etyka*. [Globalization – Politics – Ethics.] vol. IV, Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, pp. 192–217.

a result of internal and international conflicts in 2014 as many as 38 million people in the world could not stay in their homes, and many of them are trying to settle in the EU. It is over 14% more than in the previous year²⁵.

The latest election to the European Parliament, which took place on 22–25 May 2014, showed that Europeans are unhappy and confused and that it is now much more difficult for them to imagine what the European Union will look like in ten years. Surveys say that more than 60% of Europeans are afraid that their children will have a worse life than they themselves²⁶. Even today in the EU we have a considerable crowd of victims, the excluded and the offended who see the reasons for the failure in the shallowness and venality of its elites and demand to cease yielding to the dictates of cosmopolitan bureaucrats and financiers. Also EU leaders are confused, almost helpless in the face of such reality. They deal with the economy on the macro scale, while people face problems at the level of everyday life. Former Chairman of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy, right after the elections to the European Parliament said that voters ‘formulated a strong message’, and therefore the Council must give ‘clear guidance’ for the future. He was echoed by European Parliament President Martin Schulz warning that politics is unable to enforce the primacy towards multinational corporations and that Member States are easily played against one another by other major players²⁷.

The Union has raised today the lack of decisive action to the status of a political creed. It has problems with making decisions. It is slow and hesitant in matters of importance, and it is pedantic and intrusive in small matters. It is passive even with regard to its own security, which infuriates the USA. The crisis in Ukraine has shown what has already been known for a long time, namely that the EU *de facto* does not have common foreign and security policy and that it is highly divided. Germany, France and Britain push their own interests within the EU and they do it in cooperation with the Russian Federation and in opposition to the international policy of the United States. Moreover, in the case of the conflict of interests, Germany and France – as shown by the practice – choose the realization of their own interests,

²⁵ According to a report published in Geneva by the Internal Migration Monitoring Centre. *Gazeta Wyborcza* 7 May 2015.

²⁶ See Mniej Europy, więcej Europy. Adam Leszczyński rozmawia z Iwanem Krastewem. [Less Europe, more Europe. Adam Leszczyński’s interview with Ivan Krastev.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 31 May – 1 June 2014, p. 23.

²⁷ See Ostrowski, M. 2014. Koniec marzeń. [End of dreams.] *Polityka* 4–10 June 2014, pp. 58–60. See also Schulz, M. 2014. *Skrepowany OLBRZYM. Ostatnia szansa Europy.* [The chained giant. Europe’s last chance.] Warszawa: MUZA.

especially economic ones, against the interests of the EU, attempting at the same time to reinterpret their interests in accordance with the standards and values of the EU and redefine the European interest in accordance with their own economic interest²⁸.

This type of behaviour should not be allowed, because such policy is destructive and leads to the break of the Union's unity and to its disintegration. As a result, the European Union today is weak and disregarded by the United States and other powers, primarily by China and Russia. Americans complain that Europeans do not want to help them maintain peace in the world. That under their umbrella Europe has built itself a safe paradise for which it does not want to pay, that it does not respond to threats. The discussions about whether Europe has invented a new order and passed to the next level, to the next phase of political development, or if it has only benefited from half a century of living under the American shade, has continued for years. The answer remains unknown, because no one can predict how the Union will behave when faced with a great threat. Will it disintegrate then or together defeat the enemy? Only this reaction will reveal the essence of the Union and will show its true face²⁹.

The European Union still confronts the unprecedented in its history financial crisis which has turned into an economic, political and symbolic crisis – a crisis of legitimacy of authority. The crisis concerning the nature of the construction of the EU has exposed the inability to maintain economic and monetary union in its rudimentary form and highlighted the need to strengthen the coordination of economic policies of Member States and to tighten integration towards a fiscal and banking union, and hence – a political

²⁸ See Cianciara, A. 2014. Gospodarcze uwarunkowania polityki wschodniej Niemiec i Francji. [Economic determinants of the eastern policy of Germany and France.] *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, no. 2(45) p. 192; Wong, R., Hill, Ch. eds. 2011. *National and Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 228–229.

²⁹ See Madej, M. 2013. Wpływ udziału w Wspólnej Polityce Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony na polską politykę bezpieczeństwa. [The impact of participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy on the Polish security policy.] In: Tereszkievicz, F. ed. *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans dekady*. [Poland in the European Union. The balance of the decade.] Warszawa: The Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, pp. 244–271; Koziej, S. 2011. Potrzeba nowelizacji strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The need for the amendment of the European Union's security strategy.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. IV(20), pp. 76–84; Miszczak, K. 2007. Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa. [Common Foreign and Security Policy.] *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 4, pp. 112–119.

union. In the EU, heterogeneity increases, but also because of the crisis in the euro zone, pressures on the further transfer of powers to the EU level grow, hence the deepening of differentiation seems inevitable. At the same time the politicization of European integration grows and it ceases to be a primarily bureaucratic process. Each new step towards integration generates considerable political costs for individual Member States, which in turn means the intensification of the trend toward further differentiation of European integration and the creation of a hybrid system, which, however, should not exclude a discussions about the federal prospect³⁰.

However, the differentiation of the Union is driven not only by crises pestering it and deepening integration in the euro area, for which some Member States are not ready, but also by the need to maintain Europe's position in the multipolar world, which enforces the continuation of enlargement policy and calls for innovative forms of regional cooperation. One of them may be more flexibility in the adoption of EU rules by new members and the development of, for instance, a model of partial integration or privileged partnership for those countries which do not want or are not able in the foreseeable future to fulfil all the conditions for full membership. I mean Turkey, Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries.

2. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

There are different scenarios and divergent opinions on the European Union and its future, opportunities and threats among both political elites and ordinary citizens. The period of the years 2004–2014, i.e. the past decade after the EU's enlargement to the East, arouses particular controversy in the history of the EU. The countries of the 'old Union' proclaim today that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to the East was a mistake, because it was premature and very costly for them³¹. In contrast, the 'new' EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe have grievance that in the EU they are treated

³⁰ See Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F. 2013. *Differentiated integration: explaining variation in the European Union*. Houndmills Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

³¹ See Koszel, B. 2012. Mocarstwowe aspiracje Niemiec w Europie XXI wieku: realia i perspektywy (Raport z badań). [Imperial aspirations of Germany in Europe of the 21st century: realities and prospects (Research report).] *IŻ Policy Papers*, no. 6, Poznań, p. 104.

with neglect and are excessively taken advantage of by the countries of the 'old EU'. This is a result of ignorance and too exorbitant expectations which countries in Central and Eastern Europe associated with their accession to the European Union. As confirmed by research conducted by sociologists, psychologists, lawyers and political scientists, including my research, we want the Union which is strong and effective in every respect, the Union which will be a guarantor of national interests in Europe and in the world, on the other hand, we fear the EU which is 'governed by the German-French tandem' taking care of the preservation of the sovereignty of their states, and at the same time forcing other Member States to resign from it. In fact, we have today in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe two options, two views on the European Union and on the effects after ten years of membership in the EU: positive and negative, determined by political party affiliation and professed axiology. On the one hand, we accept this organization and point to the need to be included in its decision-making mainstream and stress the positive balance of membership in the EU, on the other hand, the dangers and risks associated with Brussels are shown and negative effects are exposed. Therefore, the deepening and strengthening of the EU integration is desired, or vice versa, there is a demand for its political and ideological softening, loosening, changing in such a way that it is transformed *de facto* into some non-committal association of sovereign states, guarding its borders against the inflow of immigrants³².

Joseph H. H. Weiler, a prominent intellectual, philosopher and sociologist, rightly notes that 'a subtle change has occurred in the positioning of the idea of European integration in public discourse. The political scientists of the realists school never tire telling us, that the evolution of European integration was driven by national self-interest and cold calculations of cost and benefit to its participating Member States. But in its formative years, and for a considerable while after that, the very idea of the Community was associated with a set of values which, it seems to me, could captivate the imagination, mobilize broadly based political forces, counteract the

³² See more on this topic in Fiszer, J.M. 2014. Suwerenność Polski po dziesięciu latach członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. [Polish sovereignty after ten years of membership in the European Union.] In: Wojtaszczyk, K.A., Mizerska-Wrotkowska, M., Jakubowski, W. eds. *Polska w procesie integracji europejskiej. Dekada doświadczeń (2004–2014)*. [Poland in the European integration process. The decade of experience (2004–2014).] Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 29–59.

powerful even captivating, but often abused, pull of nationalism. Supporting the Community was to “Do the Right Thing”. It was a happy state in which one could believe that long term self-interest coincided with higher values. The reception by the public of the Maastricht Treaty is the writing on the wall – Could it be that the “Europe” of Maastricht is an ideal which has lost its mobilizing force? A force which has lost its mobilizing ideals? We are forced thus to face squarely the Ends of European Integration, often neglected in what seems to be the more urgent debate of Means – the instruments and mechanisms, political and economic, for achieving the specific objectives of the Treaties³³.

Thus, today we have to go back to the debate on integration ideals and objectives of the EU in the twenty-first century if it is to survive and become the foundation for future Europe and strengthen its position in the emerging new international system. Also, Pope Francis pointed this out in his speeches delivered on 24 November 2014 in the European Parliament and the European Council, praising Europe for the rank it gives to human rights and at the same time pointing out its social injustice and treating people as objects in the context of the difficulties which Europe’s economy is going through today and injustices it generates which particularly affect young people. He also spoke about the generation of the numerous unemployed, the growing populism and threats to peace in Europe and regions not distant from it. Pope Francis also recalled the Christian roots of Europe and referred to the visit of Pope John Paul II twenty-six years ago (in 1988) in the European institutions and speeches delivered then in which he demanded that Europe could breathe with both its western and eastern lungs. He added that today the EU is indeed ‘more extensive’ and has more influence, but is accompanied by the ‘impression of weary and aging Europe’. Pope Francis confirmed that the Church sees good in European integration and wants to renew integrating Europe. Great ideas which used to inspire Europe – as it seems – have lost their appeal today – Pope Francis said with concern. He also spoke with concern about egoism and indifference towards the weakest which grows in the EU and about the EU institutions losing citizens’ trust. He also mentioned that the revival is possible, but ‘common building of Europe cannot only revolve around the economy’ and ‘we cannot allow the

³³ See Weiler, J.H.H. 2007. Europa końca wieku: czy nowe szaty mają swojego cesarza? [Europe after Maastricht – Do the new clothes have an emperor?] *Nowa Europa*, I(5) pp. 18–19.

Mediterranean to become a vast cemetery' for immigrants drowning on the way to the Old Continent³⁴.

J.H.H. Weiler, cited above, is also an optimist and unlike many other Eurosceptics, as well as researchers and experts, he believes that: 'the Community is not doomed nor even fatally wounded. And its ability to rebound from crisis is part of its history. Crisis, after all, has always been the sign of its vitality, its relevance. Europe would, however, be served if current debate about its future addressed not only means but ends too'³⁵.

British historian and political scientist Timothy Garton Ash, who believes that the European Union and the whole of Europe is now in a big crisis, and not just a financial and economic crisis, belongs to these 'many other researchers and experts', taking a realistic and pessimistic position with regard to integration, the EU and its future. He writes that 'European integration has rightly been described as a project of the elites, but Europe's peoples shared these memories. When the project faltered, as it did many times, the elites' reaction was to seek some way forward, however complicated. Until the 1990s, when the custom of holding national referendums on European treaties began to spread, Europeans were seldom asked directly if they agreed with the solutions found, although they could periodically vote in or out of office the politicians responsible for finding them. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that for about 40 years, the project of European unification could rely on at least a passive consensus among most of Europe's national publics. (...) Yet that project began to go wrong soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as western European leaders hastily set course for a structurally flawed monetary union. While many governments, companies, and households piled up unsustainable levels of debt, young Europeans from Portugal to Estonia and from Finland to Greece came to take peace, freedom, prosperity, and social security for granted. When the bubble burst, it left many feeling bitterly disappointed and led to excruciating divergences between the experiences of different nations. Now, with the current crisis still unresolved, Europe lacks most of the motivating forces that once propelled it toward unity. Even if a shared fear of the consequences of the eurozone's collapse saves it from the

³⁴ See Bielecki, T. 2014. Europa podstarzała i przytłumiona. [Weary and aging Europe.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 26 November 2014, p. 2; Moszyński, P. 2014. Papież chwali i gani Europę. [Pope praises and rebukes Europe.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 26 November 2014, p. 17.

³⁵ See Weiler, J.H.H. Europa końca wieku... [Europe after Maastricht...] p. 19.

worst, Europe needs something more than fear to make it again the magnetic project it was for a half century³⁶.

But what is this ‘something more’ supposed to be, or in other words, what does the EU need today in order to last and develop in every way and play an important role in the international arena, the role of the leading actor, with the opinion of which other actors, among others, the United States and Russia will count? The answer to such a questions is not easy, but I will try to do it later in this paper. T.G. Ash promotes the idea that the European Union is closed today in a dysfunctional triangle composed of national policy, European policy and global markets, and decisions important for it are taken by leaders of Member States, on the basis of striking a bargain behind closed doors in Brussels, who take into account not good and the future of the whole Union, but only politics and the media in their own countries. In addition, he finds the reasons for the weaknesses and shortcomings of today’s EU in the fact that *de facto* there is still no truly European policy, and no broad European public sphere³⁷.

In order to survive and be able to continue to develop, the European Union, needs not only a banking and fiscal union, but it urgently needs a political union and strengthening of solidarity among its citizens, on which it will be able to lean, as well as a certain amount of European patriotism, which is still not there, instead there are fast growing frustration, selfishness, national and ethnic particularism and deeper and deeper divisions between the East and the West, the North and the South. In this context we can agree with T.G. Ash’s thesis that ‘(...) the deepest problem of the European project is the problem of success. Over the last decade, European peoples with historical complexes about being consigned to the periphery of Europe felt themselves to be at last entering the core. Eastern Europeans joined the EU. Southern Europeans thought they were flourishing in the eurozone. In Athens, Lisbon, and Madrid, there was a sense of a levelling up of European societies, of a new, not merely formal equality among nations. Now that illusion has been shattered’³⁸.

Today, many experts and scholars worry about the future of European integration and the European Union and propose various ways to rescue them. I would like to draw attention here to recent dissertations of the

³⁶ See Ash, T.G. 2012. Kryzys Europy. Czyli jak Unia powstała i dlaczego się rozpada. [The crisis of Europe. How the Union came together and why it’s falling apart.] *Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 115/116, pp. 10–11.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 18–19.

next three distinguished experts on EU issues: Claus Offe, Jan Zielonka and Giandomenico Majone, which are part of the intellectual debate on the future of European integration and the European Union. They propose a broader and systemic view of the necessary EU reforms going beyond proposals for cosmetic changes of an institutional nature, which are now dominant in the public discourse³⁹. In their opinion, today it is necessary to change the method of integration in Europe. At the same time it does not concern only cosmetic changes in the functioning of the institutional system, such as combining the functions of President of the Council and the European Commission or greater control of the European Parliament over the Commission, but it is about a systemic change of the operating logic of integration processes in the direction of making them more flexible. 'Less integration', or making it more flexible and a better adaptation to the interests of individual countries and the needs of their citizens, could mean the end of the European Union in its current form, but it will not mean the end of European integration. The considerations of these three authors refer *de facto* to the sources and the legitimacy of European integration in the future. And thus, C. Offe puts emphasis on the problem of implementation of the post-crisis strategies and mobilizing citizens in favour of the European project (legitimacy at the output) and J. Zielonka and G. Majone focus on restoring the output legitimacy of the integration project, that is the reform carried out in such a way that its actions (effects) are effective, and the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus are visible and obvious to the public. In my opinion, the philosophy of the EU operation and the way politicians think about it need to be changed. The EU should be for citizens and not for politicians who are to blame for its mistakes and shortcomings.

The financial and economic crisis of the years 2008–2014 has revealed not only weaknesses, but has also deepened all the deficits and irregularities in the functioning of the EU project, and has shown that neo-liberal democracy today is experiencing a serious crisis. Seven years have passed since its explosion and still no one has been bold enough to proclaim the definitive

³⁹ See Offe, C. 2015. *Europe entrapped*. Cambridge: Polity Press; Zielonka, J. 2014. *Is the EU doomed?* Cambridge: Polity Press; Majone, G. 2014. *Rethinking the Union of Europe post-crisis: has integration gone too far?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cianciara, A.K. 2015. Alternatywne wizje integracji europejskiej: rozważania na kanwie najnowszych prac Offe, C., Zielonki, J. i Majone, G. [Alternative visions of European integration: reflections on the canvas of the latest works of Offe, C. Zielonka, J. and Majone, G.] *Biuletyn Analiz i Opinii*, no. 02/2015, Warszawa: ISP PAN, pp. 1–10.

end of the turbulences. It raises the question, what has been changed during these seven years in response to the crisis? It seems that most has been made in the area of supervision, where, among others, macro-prudential supervision bodies have been established (unfortunately in Poland still not yet) and there has been a flood of regulations, called a regulatory tsunami. One of them is the target economic and monetary union, the idea of which is even greater integration of the euro area countries. This project, at the current stage of implementation, however, does not solve all the problems of the euro area, which is still seen primarily through the prism of a single currency, and actions of the European Central Bank (ECB). And the situation of individual economies of Euroland is very diverse, which significantly hampers single monetary policy, good for all countries of the euro zone. Thus, the euro area is still more a political than an economic project. There are many other issues to be solved for the EU to be able to function effectively in the future. Another question arises here whether another crisis is possible. Many economists say yes, but no one really knows when it will break out and where. It cannot be excluded that we will live in a time of perpetual crisis which will take on different faces, and not necessarily dramatically affect the lives of all citizens of the world. It should be also remembered that the worlds of politics and economy, including financial markets, create a system of connected vessels. And it is on this plane that a new strategic vision for the EU should be developed⁴⁰.

Even today in the EU we have a considerable crowd of victims, the excluded and the offended who see the reasons for the failure in the shallowness and venality of political elites and demand to cease yielding to the dictates of cosmopolitan bureaucrats and financiers. Also, what seems very strange, EU leaders are confused, helpless in the face of problems which hinder the efficient functioning of the EU and conducting effective internal and external policies. It was evidenced, among other things, by the election to the European Parliament, which took place on 22–25 May 2014⁴¹ and the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war⁴².

⁴⁰ See Zaleska, M. 2015. Kryzysowe przemyślenia. [Crisis reflections.] *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* 11 March 2015, p. A14.

⁴¹ See Ostrowski, M. 2014. Koniec marzeń. [End of dreams.] *Polityka* 4–10 June 2014, pp. 58–60; Schulz, M. 2014. *Skrepowany OLBRYM. Ostatnia szansa Europy* [The chained giant. Europe's last chance.] Warszawa: MUZA, p. 41.

⁴² See more in Madej, M. 2013. *Wpływ udziału w wspólnej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony na polską politykę bezpieczeństwa*. [The impact of participation in the common security and defence policy on the Polish security policy.] In: Tereszkiwicz, F. ed. *Polska w Unii*

Decisions about pulling Ukraine into EU's sphere of influence and condemning and 'penalizing' Russia for wanting to prevent this are crucial in the EU policy. On 21 March 2014 the EU and Ukraine signed in Brussels the political part of the Association Agreement. It was a symbolic gesture of support for the EU's eastern neighbour and the interim government in Kiev at a difficult time for Ukraine (after the loss of Crimea). Then, to avoid bankruptcy of Ukraine, the new government received economic support from the EU, the United States and the International Monetary Fund. Several weeks after the election of Petro Poroshenko for the new President of Ukraine, on 27 June 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed the trade part of the Association Agreement. Incidentally, this agreement does not provide for Ukraine's membership in the European Union, which I think is a serious mistake. The EU failed to offer considerable financial help to Ukraine, whereas Russia came forward with such a proposal. Only after the power in Kiev had been taken by the political opposition, and therefore supporters of Ukraine's integration with the EU and Russia's pressure supporting the separation of Crimea had increased, did Brussels present the new government in Kiev an offer of aid amounting to approximately 11 billion EUR. The European Union, consisting of 28 countries, with often divergent interests, was not able to quickly impose sanctions on Russia, and agreed on more severe restrictions only at the end of July 2014. What is important, they do not concern the refusal on gas imports from Russia or previously concluded contracts in other areas, and some Member States of the Union – as I have already written – criticized the policy of sanctions against Russia, among others, Hungary and Slovakia. The situation revealed deep divisions within the EU into countries which strongly support the imposition of sanctions on Russia, inter alia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and countries which, guided by practical considerations, approached the sanctions cautiously and carefully, inter alia, above-mentioned Hungary and Slovakia, as well as Germany, Spain, Finland and France. The greatest propagators of anti-Russian sanctions are Poland and Lithuania, which got almost hysterical and frighten the world with the World War Three⁴³. Lithuanian President

Europejskiej. Bilans dekady. [Poland in the European Union. The balance of the decade.] Warszawa: The Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, pp. 244–271; Koziej, S. 2011. Potrzeba nowelizacji strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The need for the amendment of the European Union's security strategy.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. IV (20), pp. 76–84.

⁴³ See Rosja musi zaatakować Polskę jeśli chce odbudować imperium. [Russia must attack Poland if it wants to rebuild the empire.] *Newsweek Polska* [Online] 18 Feb-

Dalia Grybauskaitė said that ‘attacking Ukraine, Russia is in a state of war against Europe’⁴⁴. Lithuania has also released a special guide which describes what action should be taken in the event of a state of war between Russia and Lithuania. On the other hand, President Bronisław Komorowski on 1 March 2014 stated that: ‘After President Vladimir Putin’s application to the Russian upper house for the consent to the possible use of military force throughout Ukraine, this matter has become extremely dramatic. (...) We may feel threatened by the potential use of Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine adjacent to Poland’⁴⁵. What is more, for the first time in history Poland asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to convene an urgent meeting of the NATO Council, invoking Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Under this Article, any member may request a meeting of the NATO Council, if it recognizes that the territorial integrity, political independence, or independence of a member of the Alliance are at risk.

I think that Poland is too actively involved in events in Ukraine, exposing itself to Russia’s retaliation, particularly severe for Polish agriculture. It results from the fundamental assumptions of Polish foreign policy which treats strengthening of Ukraine’s independence and its Western foreign policy course as one of the fundamental guarantees that Russia will not return to imperial policy. Russia is treated in Poland as a major threat to national security, and the consequence of this policy is the repulsion of Russia from Europe, fencing it with a buffer belt in the form of pro-Western countries on the eastern border. This is a modern implementation of the ‘Jagiellonian idea’ and of the old concept of Juliusz Miroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyc, put together. That is why, Poland is in favour of democratization of Ukraine and enabling it to join the EU and NATO⁴⁶.

Meanwhile, the aggression of Russia against Ukraine has revealed the complete failure of the above calculations, and in general the failure of the EU’s eastern policy, and particularly its policy towards Russia. Since its inception, the EU has worked hard in relations with Russia to realize its basic objectives: to involve Russia into ever closer relations with Europe,

ruary 2015. Available at: <http://polska.newsweek.pl/wojna-naukrainie-rosja-musi-zaatakowac-polske-twierdzi-byly-minister.artykul,357321,I.html>

⁴⁴ See Robinson, W.B., Evans, S.J. 2014. Russia ‘practically’ at war with Europe, says Lithuanian president as Ukraine accuses Putin’s of flattening border town. *The Daily Mail* 30 August 2014.

⁴⁵ See [Online] Available at: <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,2822,polska-wystapila-o-zwolania-rady-polnocnoatlantyckiej.html>

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 20–23.

so that the created interdependencies lead to changes in Russia and to its convergence with the EU. The war with Ukraine has shown that Russia has been able to reverse this relationship. But the EU and its major powers have not been able to bring themselves to a firm reaction due to the financial and economic interests and subjecting themselves to the Russian interpretations relating to Moscow's ambitions and 'rights' and the sense of bilateral EU – Russia relations⁴⁷.

The crisis in Ukraine has shown what has already been known for a long time, namely that the EU is divided and *de facto* there is no common foreign and defence policy and its other policies, including e.g. immigration policy, are ineffective. It has also shown that the EU is actually governed by Germany and France, which took upon themselves the task of conducting a dialogue about Ukraine between Moscow and the EU. It must also be remembered that the European Union since its inception, that is since signing of the Maastricht Treaty, has sought to be a normative superpower. According to this treaty, the essence of the EU's identity is the fight for the preservation of peace and security and the development of international cooperation in accordance with the axiology of the Union and the United Nations Charter. In addition, the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms has become the superior objective of the EU. And in this respect the EU's activity has been second to none and brought a lot of effects, especially in four areas: trade, human rights, security, protection of the environment and of the Earth's climate.

After early successes, the creation of common security and defence policy slowed down, although according to the security strategy adopted in 2003 the EU was to be able to share the responsibility for global security and building a better world. This was due to many reasons. The issues connected with the use of military resources, and to some extent also non-military ones of the Member States to build international stability and security, because, on the one hand, they touch the spheres traditionally considered the nucleus of sovereignty of states and their most fundamental interests, on the other hand, they are associated with large financial outlays. It means that they are not susceptible to integration processes, maintaining largely a traditional intergovernmental shape. This was reflected even in the institutional shape of the (former European) Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP) and in decision-making processes binding in its framework which still

⁴⁷ See Kuźniar, R. 2014. Europa i porządek międzynarodowy. [Europe and the international order.] *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, vol. 50, no. 2, p. 52.

require reaching a consensus among all participating countries. It seems to me that this is one of the main reasons for the relatively limited development of cooperation in the sphere of defence within the European Union, especially in comparison with other areas of European integration. During the war with Iraq, the US managed to divide the EU and *de facto* halt its endeavour to strategic autonomy and subjectivity⁴⁸. The financial and economic crisis since 2008 as well as opposition or lack of interest of different EU countries have aggravated the situation. This crisis has weakened France, which has ceased to be a full-fledged partner of Germany and even more so Italy, and London announced its intention to reduce its presence in the EU and proclaimed a referendum on the continuation of the British presence in the structures of the European Union to take place in 2017. Germany weakened in this way could not provide the EU with political leadership. So when during the reign of Barack Obama Europe got the green light from Washington, turning towards Asia, for autonomous action on security issues, then Europeans, who were divided and reluctant to military effort, lost their enthusiasm and did not take advantage of this opportunity in order to strengthen the EU and its role in building a new international order. Consequently, Europe today is not a great independent power on a global scale and few expect that the European Union any time soon will reach the rank of a politically significant global player and the leading role of the United States seems uncertain⁴⁹.

The EU can still today be accused of many sins, including, among others, the growing separatist tendencies, with which it cannot cope in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Corsica and South Tyrol. What is more, the Union is detached from its citizens, and its citizens do not identify with the EU. This favours the accumulation of Euro-scepticism and renationalization tendencies, which are exploited by populist and extreme nationalist parties in order to struggle for power and against expanding the Union and the influx of immigrants to the EU. For example, Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front in France, which enjoys the growing public support, does not hide the

⁴⁸ See Świątek, H. 2011. *Wojna z Irakiem w 2003 roku. Główne przyczyny.* [The war with Iraq in 2003. The main causes.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar; Zarychta, S. 2014. *Doktryny i strategie NATO 1949–2013.* [Doctrines and strategies of NATO 1949–2013.] Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona.

⁴⁹ See Kuźniar R. ed. 2011. *Kryzys 2008 a pozycja międzynarodowa Zachodu.* [The crisis in 2008 and the international position of the West.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar; Brzeziński, Z. 2013. *Strategiczna wizja. Ameryka a kryzys globalnej potęgi.* [A strategic vision. America and the crisis of the global power.] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

fact that she seeks to destroy the EU and to purify France and Europe from immigrants⁵⁰.

On the other hand, the EU itself is still an attractive 'promised land' for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from around the world. It still has an enormous power of attraction, as evidenced by the queue of countries striving for membership in this specific association of democratic and sovereign states. Today it is hard to imagine Europe and the world without the European Union. Therefore, all in all, as Timothy Garton Ash writes: 'The fear of collapse, the Monnet-like logic of necessity, the power of inertia: these may just keep the European venture (that is the UE – J.M.F.) on the road, but they will not create a dynamic, outward-looking European Union that enjoys the active support of its citizens. Without some new driving forces, without a positive mobilization among its elites and peoples, the EU, while probably surviving as an origami palace of treaties and institutions, will gradually decline in efficacy and real significance, like the Holy Roman Empire of yore'⁵¹.

CONCLUSION

The year 2014, and in particular developments in Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa made Europe aware that the end of the history, in which people believed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR was an illusion. Triumphalism and the hope for 'eternal peace' have ended, and the belief in the gradual but inevitable democratization of the following countries and societies has been undermined. In light of the dramatic events in Kiev, Crimea and Donbas, as well as in Syria, Iraq and Paris, numerous shortcomings of the European Union have become clearly visible and its prestige in the world has also weakened. Eleven years after the big EU enlargement to the East, peace and security of Europe and the world are now seriously threatened. Concerns arise today especially due to such phenomena and processes as undermining the credibility of disarmament agreements, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the persistence of authoritarian regimes and confrontational attitudes, disrespect for international law, democratic standards, human rights, ethnic and religious minorities, escalating international terrorism and organized crime.

⁵⁰ See Grosse, T.G. 2014. W oczekiwaniu na rewolucję. [In anticipation of the revolution.] *Rzeczpospolita* 22 July 2014, p. A11.

⁵¹ See. Ash, T.G. 2012. Kryzys Europy... [The crisis of Europe...] p. 19.

The world today clearly evolves in a multipolar and multi-civilizational direction, but the role of the EU and of the West in the international arena decreases. The West loses its economic, political, demographic and moral foundations, and it ceases to be a model of development for the world. The European Union, despite many problems still has potentials in order to become an active player in the Euro-Atlantic system and a new global order. However, it has to gradually deepen and expand and improve its political and economic system (perhaps in a federalist direction) to become a global player, both in geo-economic and geopolitical aspects.

This is necessary because the West, which after the financial and economic crisis of the years 2008–2014 and prestigious diplomatic failures, and in the case of the United States also military ones (Iraq, Afghanistan), has clearly lost its way. Unable to find it in the occurring transformation of the global order, and remaining on the defensive against the BRIC group, it has chosen Russia for his rival, trying to push it to the periphery of the world politics. Meanwhile, Russia under Putin's reign becomes stronger and stronger and is actively involved in the global game. Therefore, we should talk to it, not isolate it internationally, because it forces Russia to aggressive actions, as exemplified by its war with Ukraine, which could lead to a new cold war in international relations, and even to the third world war. The normalization of relations between the West and Russia is also a necessary condition for Ukraine's exit from a deep crisis, which should have the right to freely choose its economic and political partners⁵².

The European Union accustomed to the use of soft power and tired by the crisis digesting it, has neither determination nor awareness of the growing threat and looks to the United States which after the defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq are also not willing to engage in defence of democracy in Ukraine. As a result of this, the escalation of violence on the part of Russia, in particular the unilateral seizure of Crimea, did not meet with the appropriately tough response of the West. This demonstrates – in my opinion – the exhaustion of the United States and the European Union by the long lasting financial and economic crisis and shows that the Euro-Atlantic alliance today also experiences a deep crisis and loses its strategic power, which emboldens Russia. Putin uses many different though interrelated instruments. However, it is essential to talk

⁵² See Mearsheimer, J. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 1–16; Cohen, S.F. 2014. Patriotic heresy vs. the new cold war: fallacies of US policy may be leading to war with Russia. *The Nation* 15 September 2014, p. 3; Maciejewicz, P. 2015. Ukraina – terapia szokowa. [Ukraine – shock therapy.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 14–15 March 2015, p. 8.

to Russia ruled by Vladimir Putin and to him, ultimately even using force and not just the strength of arguments that Russia does not recognize. And Ukraine will not win the war with Russia without Western military and economic aid. We must, therefore, turn back Russia to the right path as soon as possible, resorting to various means – diplomatic, economic and military ones.

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THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OR THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? CAUSES AND EFFECTS

Summary

The crisis of the European Union or the crisis of European integration? This dilemma, seemingly contradictory, is the subject of the analysis in this article. The author tries to prove the thesis that today we are facing a crisis of the EU, which entails a crisis of European integration. According to the author, even if the European Union broke up, nobody and nothing would be able to stop the process of European integration, at most it might be slowed down. At the same time, the author emphasizes here that 2014, and particularly dramatic events in Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa show that the 'end of the history', in which people believed after the fall of communism in Europe was an illusion. Triumphalism and the hope for eternal peace have ended, and the belief in the gradual but inevitable democratization of the following countries and societies has been strongly undermined. Peace and security of Europe and the world are today – according to the author – seriously threatened. Eleven years after the great enlargement of the EU in 2004, its numerous shortcomings have been revealed and its role and prestige in the international arena have weakened. The author is trying to answer the questions why it happened and what should be done to prevent the EU from disintegration.

KRYZYS UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ CZY KRYZYS INTEGRACJI EUROPY? PRZYCZYNY I SKUTKI

Streszczenie

Kryzys Unii Europejskiej czy kryzys integracji Europy? Ten dylemat, pozornie sprzeczny, jest przedmiotem analizy w niniejszym artykule. Autor próbuje udowodnić tezę, że dziś mamy do czynienia z kryzysem UE, który pociąga za sobą kryzys integracji Europy. Zdaniem autora, nawet gdyby Unia Europejska rozpadła się, to nikt i nic już nie jest w stanie powstrzymać procesu europejskiej integracji, co najwyżej może go przyhamować. Jednocześnie autor podkreśla tutaj, że rok 2014, a zwłaszcza dramatyczne wydarzenia na Ukrainie, Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie i w Afryce Północnej pokazują, że „koniec historii”, w który uwierzono po upadku komunizmu w Europie, był złudzeniem.

Triumfalizm i nadzieja na trwały pokój skończyły się, a wiara w stopniową lecz nieuchronną demokratyzację kolejnych państw i społeczeństw zostały mocno nadwątlone. Pokój i bezpieczeństwo Europy i świata są dziś – zdaniem autora – poważnie zagrożone. Jedenaście lat po wielkim rozszerzeniu UE w 2004 roku, ujawniły się jej liczne mankamenty oraz uległa osłabieniu jej rola i prestiż na arenie międzynarodowej. Autor próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytania, dlaczego tak się stało i co należy uczynić, aby UE nie rozpadła się.

КРИЗИС ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА ИЛИ КРИЗИС ИНТЕГРАЦИИ ЕВРОПЫ? ПРИЧИНЫ И СЛЕДСТВИЯ

Резюме

Кризис Европейского Союза или кризис интеграции Европы? Эта дилемма, на вид противоречивая, является объектом анализа настоящей статьи. Автор пытается аргументировать тезис о том, что сегодня мы имеем дело с кризисом ЕС, который повлечёт за собой кризис интеграции Европы. По мнению автора, даже если бы Европейский Союз распался, никто и ничего не в состоянии остановить процесс европейской интеграции; самое большее, что можно сделать – притормозить его развитие. Автор одновременно подчёркивает, что 2014 год, в особенности трагические события на Украине, Ближнем и Среднем Востоке и в Северной Африке показывают, что «конец истории», в который многие поверили после падения коммунизма в Европе, оказался иллюзией. Триумф и надежда на прочный мир сменились разочарованием, а вера в постепенную, но неизбежную демократизацию очередных государств и обществ сильно пошатнулась. Мир и безопасность Европы на сегодняшний день – по мнению автора – находятся под угрозой. Спустя 11 лет после масштабного расширения Европейского Союза в 2004 году выявились его многочисленные изъяны, а также значительно ослабили его роль и престиж на международной арене. Автор пытается ответить на вопросы, почему так получилось и что следует предпринять, чтобы Европейский Союз не распался.